Introduction
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) is one of the principal treaties of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The agreement covers twelve services sectors, including education (WTO 2000) . Since this agreement was created, the global governance of education scenario has become more complex because a set of trade disciplines and commercial rules have become relevant to education regulation activities at the national and sub-national level.
The system of rules of the GATS pushes for the progressive liberalization of education all over the world and for the constitution of a new international regime on trade in education. However, if we observe the actual results of the GATS negotiations, it doesn't seem that the 'globalization project' impelled by the agreement has been totally successful. Most of the WTO member countries avoided committing education during the Uruguay Round (1986 Round ( -1994 and, when they did, they introduced numerous limitations and exceptions. Something similar happened during the more recent Doha Round (2001-ongoing in 2008) .
The uneven evolution of the GATS raises several questions. Specifically, the question this article tries to answer is: why do countries decide to participate -or not to participate -in the new multilateral 'free-trade in education regime' through the adoption of liberalization commitments within the GATS? This question will be answered through an explanation based on mechanisms. In doing so, I aim to reveal the causal mechanisms of education liberalization within the GATS and to explore 1 how the effectiveness of these mechanisms is contingent on contextual conditions and national politics.
The article is composed of four sections. First, I describe the object of my research as well as my framework of inquiry, which is inspired by the 'Globally Structured Agenda for Education' approach (GSAE) (Dale 2000) . Second, I explore the structures that frame the liberalization process, referring specifically to the WTO rules that affect more directly negotiations in service sectors. Third, I discuss the preferences settlement of countries in GATS and education negotiations, focusing on their decisions as well as on the inter-scalar complexities of the decision-making procedure. Finally, I argue that the key mechanisms of education liberalization commitments of the countries are embedded within the dominant negotiation rationale within the WTO context. I also highlight the conditions that mediate between the activation of the mechanisms and their political outcomes.
My argument is based on intensive fieldwork involving international actors who directly participate in the negotiation subsystem of the GATS (trade negotiators in the WTO headquarters and WTO staff). The fieldwork has been more intensive in relation to two countries (Argentina and Chile), where I have also interviewed Ministry of Trade representatives and education stakeholders representatives. Doing field-work at the national level was necessary to capture the multi-level nature of trade negotiations as well as to have a more complete picture of the politics of the services negotiations. The main criterion for selecting the countries was comparability. The two cases are 'comparable' because they share some features, but they differ in relation to the independent variable (Green 2003) . In our case, the latter means that each country has a different behavior when negotiating education in the framework of the GATS (Argentina has publicly stated that is not going to commit education under any trade agreement, and Chile signaled its willingness to include education within the Doha Round framework and, in fact, has already opened education to trade in numerous bilateral trade agreements). Between June 2005 and December 2007, I conducted a total of twenty-seven interviews of trade representatives and twenty-nine interviews of education representatives. The interviews retrieved data about the procedure of the negotiations (consultations to stakeholders, articulation of the negotiations between the global and national level, etc.), the position of the country in relation to the liberalization of education within the GATS as well as the rationale that grounds the position adopted.
Education Sciences and the 'Politics of Education' Turn
Since the 1990s, research on 'globalization' has been strongly present in the field of education sciences. But globalization is more than a new topic in the research agenda. Taking globalization seriously means having to review the theory and methodology we use, as well as the analytical instruments and the core research questions. One theoretical approach that seeks to face these challenges is the Globally Structured Agenda for Education approach (GSAE). The GSAE provides a coherent corpus of theoretical and conceptual elements to capture the complex and multidimensional relation between globalization and education. Its main ontological assumption is that the world capitalist economy is the driving force of globalization and the first causal source of multiple transformations manifested in different policy areas, including education. Consequently, capitalism's expansion and transformations directly and indirectly affect contemporary education systems, although its effects on education systems are also locally mediated (Dale 2000) . So, globalization is not an absolute project with identical effects in all places (Robertson and Dale 2006) .
Although globalization presents common features around the world, the effects of globalization in education and in other fields are mediated by domestic factors and contingencies.
Following this approach, one of the objectives of educational research should be to explain the link between the changes in the global economy and politics, and the changes in national educational policies and practices (Dale 2000) . This implies recognizing that education outcomes are not always related to educational inputs and procedures, at least in part because education is highly influenced by extraeducational events and processes. That is the reason why the GSAE stresses the need to methodologically transcend 'educationism' and to consider the 'politics of education' level of analysis (Dale and Robertson 2007) . The politics of education refer to the educational agenda and the processes and structures through which this agenda is created (Dale, 1994) . In a more globalized environment, the politics of education level of analysis entails understanding education problems and systems as embedded within a complex local, national and global political economy (Novelli and Lopes-Cardozo 2008) . In this context, international organizations, both regional and global, are becoming more influential in the settlement of policy agendas that will frame education politics at the national and local level (Robertson and Dale 2006) .
The increasing role of a broad range of finance-driven and humanitarian international organizations in education means that we need to adopt an inter-sectorial approach to explain education. To a great extent, this is due to the fact that these organizations do not always treat education as a topic; they rather conceive education as a resource to deal with other topics (Jones 2007) . So, they subordinate education to non-education agendas that cover, for instance, social and economic issues, such as poverty reduction, economic growth and, since the constitution of the WTO, international trade.
Furthermore adopting a pluri-scalar conception of education phenomena 4 permits a more accurate representation of the nature of power relations, decisiontaking procedures and the outcomes of these procedures. In the global era, it is important to analyse the same phenomenon in more than one scale and to differenciate how the elements are presented and articulated in each of the relevant scales (Robertson et al. 2002) . In one word, the scalar interaction and the scalar division of education governance become new variables that introduce complexity to education reality and, consequently, to education analysis.
Finally, the politics of education focus implies that the (re)structuring of a global education agenda is not a process without subjects. International organizations, transnational corporations and powerful states are key actors in shaping and driving this process. Nevertheless, globalization can also be contested -and transformedthrough a range of sociopolitical and discursive processes, strategies, and struggles, led by labor unions or local and global social movements (Robertson et al 2002) .
Focus on Mechanisms
Global structures contribute, more and more, to our understanding of a broad range of education events and changes that emerge at the national and local levels.
However, a more strategic and relational argumentation line would also contemplate that education events and changes are the consequence of causal mechanisms activated by actors in different scales and layers of structure. The GSAE identifies a set of external mechanisms that, once activated, account for the global influences in national education policy. Specifically, Dale (1999) categorizes a series of voluntary and compulsory global mechanisms, normally related to international organizations, which, in recent decades, have acquired more centrality than traditional mechanisms of external influence such as `policy borrowing' and `policy learning'. These new mechanisms are:
• imposition is activated when external actors, such as international organizations or powerful states, compel some countries to take on particular education policies (the classic example being the conditionality to credit of the World Bank, the IMF and other aid agencies to borrower countries);
• harmonization is realized when a set of countries mutually agree on the implementation of common policies in a certain policy area (e.g., the configuration of the European Space for Higher Education);
• dissemination is activated when an international organization uses persuasion and its technical knowledge to convince countries on the implementation of certain policies (e.g., through annual reports, best practices data-bases and technical assistance)s;
• standardization occurs when the international community defines and promotes the adhesion to a set of policy principles and standards that frame the countries' behavior (e.g., international performance tests, such as the PISA, contribute to the standardization of curricular content at the global level); and
• installing interdependence occurs when countries agree to achieve common objectives to tackle problems that require international cooperation (e.g., climate change, 'education for all').
Definition of the Research Problem
The emergence of an international organization, such as the WTO, that promotes free trade at a global level and directly alters national education regulation, validates the GSAE's main claim regarding global capitalism as the primary causal source of important changes in the education field. The constitution of GATS itself represents a radical change of the rules of the game for transnational education.
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However, as will be developed, the GATS is an incomplete agreement that must be Article XXI (also included in the progressive liberalization section) establishes significant impediments for countries to break off liberalization commitments.
These articles make clear that the rules of the game contained in the GATS are not only about trade; they are about the promotion of a specific system of international trade: 'free trade'.
2 Thus, the constitutive rules and principles of the WTO/GATS seek the promotion of free trade at a global scale. They present this specific trade system as the "natural kind of capitalism" that all the countries of the world should embrace (Wade 2005) . There are other principles that theoretically orient the role and content of the WTO, but none of them is so well fixed as the freetrade principle. In fact, this principle is stronger in the WTO than in the precursor trade rules, the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), adopted in 1947 and incorporated into the WTO when it was established in 1995. The original GATT instituted a commercial regime of Keynesian-embedded liberalism. But the WTO, which was created in a period of neoliberal climax, clearly breaks the balance 8 between the global liberalization objective and the capacity of states to deliver on their social purposes, for instance, providing public services such as health and education (Ford 2002; Ruggie 1994) .
The methodology of the negotiation of services constitutes another important set of rules to understand the GATS outcomes. The specific methodology is not totally fixed in the GATS; member countries have to reach a consensus on negotiation procedures at the beginning of each negotiation round. In the two services rounds (Uruguay and Doha), the demand-offer method was adopted. First, each country makes demands to other countries to open those service sectors in which they are interested. Then, the countries respond to these demands by listing the sectors (e.g., education, health, tourism) and subsectors (e.g., primary, secondary, higher education, As the analysis of the WTO rules shows, member countries are encouraged to establish liberalization commitments in education (and other services sectors), but they are not normally forced to do it. Most states have enough leeway to decide whether they want to open their education to trade in the GATS framework (the new member countries would be the exception). So, the decision-taking procedure at the national level is a variable that can alter the results of the negotiations. That is why the politics and the actors that within and beyond "the state" drive and conduct the decision-making process in the framework of this organization must be considered.
In relation to the decision-taking process, the first thing to be acknowledged is that only a specific faction of the state represents 'the state' within the WTO.
Specifically, the WTO state representatives are linked to the Ministries of Trade, Economy and/or Foreign Affairs. This has important implications because how the decisions are framed and by whom directly affect the final result. Despite the fact that the WTO agreements have to be ratified by national parliaments in most countries, the full procedure is being coordinated by trade experts who control the data and knowledge on the policy issue as well as key information related to the negotiation process (e.g., other actors' preferences and demands). So, trade representatives conduct the negotiations and, very often, aiming to achieve the positions they prefer, Officially, however, trade ministries do not define the preferences of the country autonomously. In the case of the GATS negotiations, they are supposed to consult the stakeholders and regulators of each service sector at the national level, which is a tedious task because of the large number of sectorial meetings that are required and the wide range of demands and inputs that must be processed. The GATS covers twelve broad services sectors, and each sector represents a field where official regulators, private providers, interest groups, trade unions and quality assurance agencies interact. The fact that these actors normally make contradictory demands in the framework of the GATS negotiations makes the process much more complex. For instance, in relation to the education sector, the education ministry may be interested in opening education to trade to attract foreign investment and expertise to the higher education system, while the association of private universities may oppose it to avoid having to compete with new foreign private providers. Geneva, 2006) 13 Consequently, the consultation process cannot be as complete as it is supposed to be.
However, in addition to resource constraints, political bias and preferences also limit broader participation in the consultation processes. The decision to not commit education in these countries is associated with domestic political conditions. The first common pattern of them is that they have governments with an economic-nationalist ideology and a socialist or social-democrat orientation. Second, the governments have been receptive to the demands of anti-GATS education stakeholders (normally, public universities and teacher unions). And third, in these countries, the education ministry has intervened in the negotiations process, publicly stating that education cannot be committed in trade agreements. In 
UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity (negotiated by Education and Culture
Ministers), although both agreements have been signed, to a great extent, by the same states. 12 The GATS negotiations also reflect that non-state actors are able to become politically relevant in the global governance scenario. In fact, the red lines drawn through education in some countries show that non-state actors, such as teachers unions, can play a key role to define the country's position in certain trade areas.
Explaining GATS and Education Outcomes
The WTO rules and the negotiating procedures help us understand education trade liberalization within the GATS, but we also need to consider mediating factors such as interests and ideas of member countries. Both interests and ideas refer to human action as well as social structures and, as it will be argued, they are important components of the explanation of the results of the GATS negotiations. Settlement Rules to impose a behavior on other countries, but it has never been activated in relation to the education sector.
The External Mechanisms of Influence at the WTO
Second, harmonization could be considered a more frequent and powerful mechanism than imposition because the WTO rules encourage gradual trade liberalization, and member countries formally accepted this harmonization framework when they signed the GATS. Nevertheless, as we have seen, this process is not advancing smoothly because an important number of member countries are rejecting the establishment of liberalization commitments. Third, the standardization mechanism will become more central when the domestic regulation negotiations finish (Abugattas 2006) , but as of 2008 this was not very directly linked to the liberalization negotiations.
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Finally, the dissemination mechanism is being activated within the WTO to promote education liberalization. The WTO staff is very active in disseminating the free trade principle through different instruments (trade policy reviews, publications, courses for trade negotiators, technical assistance and so on), but these instruments have a very general nature and, hardly ever focus specifically on the education sector.
In fact, within the WTO staff, there is only one person -an international lawyerdedicated to education, and the WTO Secretariat has published only two papers on education since it was created (see WTO 1998 and 2005b Larsen et al. 2002; OECD 2004; OECD and World Bank 2007) . Although, again, the messages contained in such dissemination activities are unlikely to determine a country's decision regarding whether or not to open education to trade.
The Negotiation Rationale
Beyond top-down mechanisms, the key mechanism to understand the results of the GATS negotiations in the education field is embedded in the dominant negotiation rationale at the WTO. Educationists have tried to discover the 'education rationale' behind education liberalization under the GATS. For instance, several authors argue that some countries -such as China and Malaysia -facilitate trade in education services to attract expertise and knowledge from abroad. Therefore, they would use the GATS and other trade agreements to strengthen this capacity building process (Larsen et al. 2004; Zhang 2003) . Knight (2002) Moreover, the interviews conducted with trade negotiators show that, to some extent, the topic of education has a very low profile in the discourse of the actors that are conducting the services negotiations. When asked about education issues, trade negotiators did not demonstrate much of an awareness of the passionate debate on GATS and its effects on education initiated by the international education community, and they never referred to education sources when discussing the topic. Negotiators have their own opinions on the area, which, as mentioned, normally emphasizes the potential positive effects of GATS for education. In fact, it seems that they apply to education the same meaning frames that they would apply to the analysis of any other service or commodity.
Finally, the interview data also show that, an absence of a shared narrative on the aims and conditions that make necessary an international trade in education regime (for a more detailed analysis, see Verger 2008a). In brief, it is doubtful that the education arguments are the driving rationale of the decision of whether or not to liberalize education under the GATS.
However, a few exceptions have been identified during the Doha Round. As mentioned before, certain countries have adopted the official position of not committing education because of explicit worries over the GATS effects on education. In some countries these concerns have been directly expressed by the government (Venezuela) and in others they have been raised by influential education stakeholders and then adopted by the government (Argentina and Brazil).
14 However, this cautious approach to the education liberalization was more common during the Uruguay Round. In that round, the services area was very new and generated uncertainties that clearly conditioned the behavior of the countries, above all developing countries. This would explain why, during the Uruguay Round, the great majority of developing countries did not commit sensitive sectors such as education. In fact, this was also the attitude of countries, such as Chile, that latter on become more openly liberal in relation to trade in services:
In that moment the ignorance on services was so high that we just did what other countries did. If the developed countries did not commit education and health, we would not be so naïve to do it. Our starting point was the offers of developed countries and, from that point, we started to take out things ... We did it because of prejudice and without any fundamental reason. Also to leave negotiation spaces for the future [...] in that moment we were very cautious. (Trade   negotiator 18 , Santiago, 2006) In Uruguay, we were extremely conservative; the GATS was very new and we did the minimum possible. (Trade negotiator 17 , Santiago, 2006) In the Doha Round, the cautious approach became less relevant and most countries were willing to offer education depending on the level of ambition acquired by the negotiations. This is due to the fact that, in the framework of a multilateral negotiation, the principal objective of trade representatives is to consolidate or to open new markets to favor their national industry's export activities. If to achieve this objective they have to make some "concessions" in certain sectors (opening them to trade), they would do so. However, this negotiation rationale drastically contradicts the free trade principle at the core of the WTO system of rules. The liberal theory of trade sustains that opening national markets to international competition is not only positive for foreign exporters; it is also positive for the importer because 'free trade' optimizes utilities and contributes to a more efficient and competitive national industry and consumption markets. Instead of really applying free trade theory, negotiators seem to be swapping stickers to fulfill the interests of their country's bigger exporters. One Argentinean negotiator explained very clearly the bargaining nature of the negotiators, indicating that the objective of each country is to maximize their particular interests: "We are not going to give presents for free. When you go to the market to buy potatoes, you need five pesos, but with this money you have to try to buy a five-kilo bag, not the one-kilo bag ... We are on it." (Trade negotiator Robert Putnam (1998) has already argued that international negotiators must satisfy above all else "national interests" and push forward these interests in light of what is available to negotiators from other countries. Paul Krugman (1997, 114) has also captured very clearly the contradiction between the liberalization principle and the actual facts at the WTO and other international trade forums:
Anyone who has tried to make sense of international trade negotiations eventually realizes that they can only be understood by realizing that they are a game scored according to mercantilist rules, in which an increase in exportsno matter how expensive to produce in terms of other opportunities foregoneis a victory, and an increase in imports -no matter how many resources it releases for other uses -is a defeat.
Following Krugman's statement, the mercantilist ideology would be the master frame of the WTO negotiations. Interestingly, mercantilism was supposed to be superseded by the comparative advantage theory and by the free trade proposal a long time ago.
However, at least in the education services sector, it still constitutes an informal set of rules that casts a shadow over the formal WTO rules and is much more influential than the official liberalization rules and principles. The mercantilist ideology entails education being treated as one more bargaining chip in the framework of the above mentioned "all unique" negotiation procedure that prevails at the WTO. [FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] Nevertheless, the actual picture in the WTO is much more complex (see Figure 2 ). First, several mechanisms and rationales are activated at the same time and in contradictory ways: harmonization, the cautious approach and the strategy of using education as a bargaining chip. I have stressed that the latter, which is a consequence of the predominance of the mercantilist ideology in the WTO forum, has become the key rationale during the Doha Round (all indicators are that 'caution' was more relevant in the Uruguay Round). Mercantilism is not promoted at the WTO level;
rather, it is the consequence of WTO member countries pushing for their particular national interests (or, more precisely, for particular national industry interests).
[ Since the 1990s, the WTO has joined the group of trade and finance-driven international organizations with 'education' in its framework. The fact that education regulation is being altered by the decisions that are taken in an international trade forum is a clear example of how economic globalization affects transformations in current education systems. Indeed, the WTO system of rules, far from being neutral, tries to drive member countries to apply free trade policies in education and all other service and commodity sectors. The WTO rules are powerful, but not absolute and their effects on national education policies are not always direct. In fact, in the current round, the Doha Round, the WTO rules are clearly mediated by the mercantilist ideology that predominates in the negotiation process. After penetrating the black-box of the negotiations, it can be observed that member countries are basically pushing to maximize the interests of their national export industry. Consequently, most countries will liberalize education if doing so permits them to achieve their general trade objectives within the negotiation process. This bargaining chip mechanism is another clear sign that extra-education factors and rationales can affect the content of national educational policies and regulations. It also shows that, although the "demands of global Capital" help explain the existence of GATS, the specific demands of nationbased capitalist factions explain better whether or not countries decide to apply the GATS disciplines to the education sector. In fact, the interview findings also illustrate the role of non-state actors and the reallocation of power within global politics. Indeed, the cases analyzed suggest that the global and the local scales are not necessarily related in a deterministic way (i.e. Robertson for their comments on a previous version of this article. My gratitude is also to the anonymous reviewers and coeditors of the CER for their constructive suggestions.
2 Free trade is an international trade system that promotes or allows the unrestricted flow of goods and services between countries. This liberal conception of trade is grounded in the principle of "comparative advantage", which says that "countries prosper first by taking advantage of their assets in order to concentrate on what they can produce best, and then by trading these products for products that other countries produce best…" (WTO, 2005a, 13 ).
The WTO is clearly framed by this theory, expressing that "liberal trade policies (…) sharpen competition, motivate innovation and breed success. They multiply the rewards that result from producing the best products, with the best design, at the best price…" (WTO, 2005a, 13).
6 Source: WTO on-line documents data base (http://www.wto.org/wto/ddf/ep/search.html).
7 On occasion, the 'understanding' problems affect the negotiators themselves. As a negotiator admitted: "In relation to goods, negotiators perfectly know what they are exchanging, where are the problems, which are the barriers of trade in apples, TVs, cars, etc.
Everything is very clear. However, when negotiating services, we do it with a bandage on our eyes… There is still a lot of lack of knowledge…" (Trade negotiator 18, Santiago, 2006) 8 The Less Developed Countries (LDCs) represent an exception to this pluri-scalar negotiation procedure. This is due to the fact that LDCs concentrate their few skilled human resources in the WTO headquarters. These negotiators do not receive clear and strong national mandates and the connections and level of coordination with the national trade ministry is usually low.
As a consequence, the LDC negotiators have more autonomy to define the preferences and destiny of their country within the WTO negotiations than other countries' negotiators. This observation was also observed in the GATT case (Curzon and Curzon 1972) . 9 The 'capital' is a metaphor commonly used by the negotiators to refer to the Ministry of Trade (or equivalent) of a country. 10 In the trade negotiators' jargon, having "offensive interests" in a topic/sector means that a country is pushing proactively for the trade liberalization of this topic/sector at the international level.
11 MERCOSUR/XXIX RME/ACTA N° 2/05. November 2005. Source: www.sic.inep.gov.br 12 The UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity establishes that cultural international exchange cannot be regulated only by the market because this would mean a loss of cultural richness. The convention allows member states to promote policies to protect cultural diversity, although this contradict free trade rules (see UNESCO 2005) . 13 The Domestic Regulation working group has been settled within the WTO Council on
Trade in Services and promotes parallel negotiations to the liberalization negotiations. In the framework of this working group, member countries are trying to reach a consensus on how to complete article VI of GATS, on domestic regulation. To do that, they have to define 32 which type of national policies can be considered 'more burdensome than necessary' in keeping countries from reaching their national objectives. The negotiations are centered in regulatory aspects such as qualification requirements, licensing requirements and technical standards. 
